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“The relationship between liability and responsibility can be simply stated:
responsibility is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of liability. I am
liable to conviction or blame for X only if I am responsible for X; but I can be
responsible for X without being thus liable. The phenomena of ‘absolute’ and
‘vicarious’ liability in criminal law might seem to cast doubt on the necessity
of responsibility for liability.” 66
Herbert J. Spiro menguraikan 3 (tiga) pengertian pertanggung
ja waban (responsibility). Pertama, pertanggungjawaban sebagai
akun tabilitas (responsibility as accountability). Sebagai contoh ketika
men teri luar negeri bertanggung jawab kepada presiden dalam
pelak sanaan hubungan luar negeri. Pertanggungjawaban tersebut
berarti: Menteri Luar Negeri bertanggung jawab—baik secara
PUSLITBANG
eksplisit dan implisit—dalam tata kelola dan cara pelaksanaan hu
bungan ini dilaksanakan. Berdasarkan pengetahuan atas tugas dan
fungsinya, secara eksplisit ia bertanggung jawab atas cara urusan
luar negeri dilaksanakan secara kedinasan resmi. Dengan kata
lain, dia bertanggung jawab kepada (antara lain) Senat atau kepada
Kongres. Kedua lembaga ini menentang atau menyetujui kebijakan
luar negeri yang dijalankan atau dilaksanakan dalam isu tertentu.
Tanggung jawab secara implisit menyangkut berkaitan dengan siapa
yang dirugikan atau diuntungkan atas suatu keputusan yang dibuat.
Misalnya se orang pekerja yang kehilangan pekerjaan disebabkan
spekulasi finansial, dampak dari suatu kegiatan dan keputusan yang
tidak diperkirakan sebelumnya, secara implisit menjadi tanggung
jawab si pembuat keputusan/tindakan.
66 R. A. Duff, Answering for Crime Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Oxford
& Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007), hlm. 20 Selanjutnya ia kemukakan: “The distinction
between responsibility and liability is simply illustrated by justifications. If I wound an
assailant, this being the only way to ward off his unlawful attack on me, I have a justification
for what I do—a moral justification that saves me from moral condemnation for injuring
him, and a legal justification that should save me from a criminal conviction for wounding.
In offering this justification, I do not deny responsibility for using violence on V, orfor V’s
wound. I admit responsibility for that action and its result, as something that I had reason
not to do (for we always have reason not to use violence on fellow human beings, and to avoid
acting in ways that will injure them). I thus admit that I must answer for my action and its
result: I must answer morally to anyone whose business it is, and legally in a criminal court.
But, I claim, I have an exculpatory answer: that my action was, in its context, justified as an
act of self-defence”, Ibid., hlm. 21.
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